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BUCKLEY V. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LA W FOUNDATION,
INC.: THE STRUGGLE TO ESTABLISH A CONSISTENT

STANDARD OF REVIEW IN BALLOT ACCESS CASES
CONTINUES
INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court entered the "political thicket"'
surrounding ballot access cases in 1968 with its decision in Williams v.
Rhodes! Since then, the Court has found itself in the position of deciding ballot access issues that place the right of a state to regulate its electoral process3 against the First Amendment rights of its citizens.' In an
attempt to strike a balance between these significant interests, the Court
has applied varying standards of review when addressing state legislation
that regulates elections.! The lack of a consistent approach by the Court
has resulted in a wide range of ballot access decisions by the lower
courts.' The resulting uncertainty in ballot access law has left states to
question whether their existing election regulations are constitutional,
which has, consequently, subjected the Court to substantial criticism.7
Although the majority of the ballot access cases decided by the
Court involve state regulation of the ability of third-party candidates8 to

1. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
2. 393 U.S. 23 (1968). The Supreme Court first decided the merits of an election regulation
in 1962 in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). However, Baker involved a state's congressional
distributing scheme, not access to a state electoral ballot. Id. at 187-88.
3. "The Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections ... shall be prescribed in each State
by the Legislature thereof ... "U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
4. See Jennifer R. Abrams, Note, The Supreme Court's Disenfranchisementof the American
Electorate: Advocating the Application of Strict Scrutiny When Reviewing State Ballot Access Law
and Political Gerrymandering, 12 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 145, 145-46 (1996) (citing the
right to vote and the right of freedom of political association as First Amendment rights often
conflicting with Constitutional provisions ensuring state sovereignty over the state election process).
5. See Kevin Cofsky, Comment, Pruning the Political Thicket: The Case for Strict Scrutiny
of State Ballot Access Restrictions, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 353, 367-88 (1996) (summarizing the
standard of review applied by the Court in various ballot access cases).
6. See id. at 390-401 (providing a survey of lower court decisions that demonstrate the
difficulty these courts have in determining whether certain state ballot regulations are constitutional).
7. See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 890 (13th ed.
1997) (arguing that the Supreme Court's decisions in ballot access cases "show an especially
pervasive degree of instability regarding the appropriate level of scrutiny."); Darla L. Shaffer, Ballot
Access Laws, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 657, 657 & n.5 (1996) (citing various criticisms of the Court for
constantly altering the standard of review in ballot access cases); Cofsky, supra note 5, at 356 ("In
order to maintain a properly functioning electoral process, the Court must establish a clear standard
of review for ballot access restrictions .... ").
8. For example in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), the Court decided whether
Ohio's ballot access regulations pertaining to independent, also known as third-party, candidates
were impermissible since they differed from those applicable to candidates from the Democratic and
Republican parties.
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appear on its ballot,9 the Court occasionally deals with cases involving
state regulation of the ballot initiative process." Recently, in Buckley v.
American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., the United States Supreme Court held that three Colorado statutes regulating the ballot initiative process violated the First Amendment." The Court invalidated regulations that required petition circulators of ballot initiatives to wear identification badges, be registered voters, and, if paid, have their names disclosed by their employer.'" The Court noted that there is no "litmus-paper
test" to determine whether a ballot initiative regulation conflicts with the
First Amendment." It then went on to invalidate the regulations even
though each had a very different impact on speech.' This Comment argues the Court's holding, that Colorado's registration and disclosure requirements violate the First Amendment, further adds to the confusion
over the application of the proper standard of review in ballot access
cases. The Colorado regulations may have made it more difficult to get
an initiative on the ballot or required the disclosure of a greater amount
of information, but they did not violate the First Amendment.'5
Part I of this Comment provides background on the general constitutional framework employed by the Court when reviewing ballot access
issues, the various cases in which the Court attempted to establish a
workable standard of review, and the precedents on which the Buckley
Court relied to invoke the First Amendment. Part II discusses the facts in
Buckley and summarizes the Court's reasoning and justification for its
decision, including the criticisms offered in the concurring and dissenting
opinions. Finally, Part III critiques the Court's application of the standard
of review in Buckley and suggests a pragmatic approach to deciding future ballot access cases, particularly those pertaining to ballot initiatives,
that would allow states to effectively regulate their electoral process
while preserving the First Amendment rights of its citizens.

9. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 24 (1968); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431,
432 (1971); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 726-27 (1974).
10. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 415-17 (1988) (holding that the prohibition of paid
petition circulators violated the First Amendment by reducing the potential number of individuals
who could circulate petitions, thereby restricting political speech).
11. Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Found., 119 S. Ct. 636, 649 (1999).
12. See Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 640.
13. Id. at 642 (quoting Storer,415 U.S. at 730).
14. See id. at 642-49.
15. See Daniel Hays Lowenstein & Robert M. Stem, The FirstAmendment and Paid Initiative
Petition Circulators:A Dissenting View and a Proposal, 17 HASTING CONST. L.Q. 175, 210-11
(1989) (criticizing the Court's decision in Meyer by arguing that prohibiting the use of paid
circulators simply limits the ways that petition circulators can gather signatures, which may make it
more difficult to get an initiative on the ballot, but does not impact political speech).
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I. BACKGROUND

A. The Conflict Between State and Individual InterestsArising in Ballot
Access Cases
Twenty-four states allow citizens to bypass their state legislature to
adopt statutes and amend their state constitution' through ballot initiatives
and referendums. '" In order to ensure that a manageable number of issues
appear on a ballot,'7 and that the initiatives are not simply a byproduct of
well-funded special interest groups,' 8 these states enacted numerous
regulations to govern the initiative process."
The Court consistently recognizes the state, interest in regulating the
electoral process stating, "as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some
sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes."2 Under certain circumstances, the Court has gone as far as to hold
that "a State has an interest, if not a duty, to protect the integrity of its
political processes ....
In contrast, however, the Court has equally, and perhaps even more
vigilantly, recognized that some state regulation of the electoral process
may infringe upon individuals' rights guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.22 In response to this clash, the Court initially applied
the fundamental rights strand of the Equal Protection Clause.2 3 The Court,
however, eventually began to address ballot access cases by reviewing
the impact of state regulations on the First Amendment directly. ' This
16. See Richard B. Collins & Dale Oesterle, Structuring the Ballot Initiative:Procedures That
Do and Don't Work, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 47, 49-50 & n.5 (1995); see also COLO. CONST., art. V, §
1(l)-(2) (authorizing the citizens of Colorado to enact legislation through ballot initiatives). See
generally Harry N. Scheiber, Foreword: The Direct Ballot and State Constitutionalism,28 RUTGERS
L.J. 787 (1997) (providing a detailed description of the history of ballot initiatives).
17. See Lowenstein & Stem, supra note 15, at 201 (arguing that with fewer initiatives on the
ballot, voters will be more educated).
18. See Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 647.
19. See Collins & Oesterle, supra note 16, at 64-77 (providing a detailed description of the
then-existing Colorado ballot initiative regulations).
20. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974).
21. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972) (describing the power of the state to protect
its electoral process from "frivolous or fraudulent" candidates).
22. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968) (recognizing that the right of political
association and the right to cast an effective vote are within the scope of the First Amendment).
23. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 787 n.7 (1983) (citing as examples: Williams,
393 U.S. 23, Bullock, 405 U.S. 134, Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974) and Illinois Elections Bd. v.
Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979)).
24. In Anderson, the Court explained that:
In this case, we base our conclusions directly on the First and Fourteenth Amendments
and do not engage in a separate Equal Protection Clause analysis. We rely, however, on
the analysis in a number of our prior election cases resting on the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. These cases, applying the "fundamental rights" strand of
equal protection analysis, have identified the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights
implicated by restrictions on the eligibility of voters and candidates, and have considered
the degree to which the State's restrictions further legitimate state interests.
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change in analysis caused some commentators to observe that "the Court
has suggested that the fundamental rights strand of equal protection theory
may be redundant and slated for cancellation," because the rights of political association and freedom of speech are protected directly by the First
Amendment without regard to Equal Protection." The Court consistently
employs this type of analysis in ballot initiative cases. 6
B. Attempting to Resolve the Conflict: Deciding on a Standardof Review
Although the Court has had little difficulty clarifying the basic constitutional framework in addressing the conflict between state and individual interests in ballot access cases, it has struggled mightily in selecting a consistent standard of review.27 This struggle has resulted in unpredictable outcomes in many cases.
Before deciding Williams in 1968, the Court declined to rule on ballot access issues because it considered such issues non-justiciable political questions. 8 In Williams, however, the Court granted certiorari to rule
on the constitutionality of Ohio election laws making it "virtually impossible for a new political party ... to be placed on the state ballot .... ""
After determining that the Ohio election laws made blatant distinctions
between new and established political parties, the Court ruled that the
election laws implicated both the First Amendment right to vote and the
right of political association. The Court then used a relaxed form of strict
scrutiny to strike down the regulations." The Court stated that "only a
compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's
constitutional power to regulate can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms."3' However, the Court may have intentionally given itself some
leeway in applying this standard. As one commentator points out, the Court

Anderson, 460 U.S. at 787 n.7.
25. Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Equal ProtectionAnalysis, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 121,
150 (1989).
26. See, e.g., Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421-22 (1988); Buckley v. American
Constitutional Law Found., 119 S. Ct. 636, 640 (1999) (demonstrating the Court's implementation
of the First Amendment directly in ballot initiative cases without regard to an Equal Protection
analysis).
27. See Shaffer, supra note 7.
28. See id. at 659.
29. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 24 (1968). The primary regulation focused on by the
Court was Ohio's ballot access regulation that "requires a new party to obtain petitions signed by
qualified electors totaling 15% of the number of ballots cast in the last preceding gubernatorial
election." Id. at 24, 25. A more detailed summary of all the regulations in question are contained in the
first footnote of the opinion.
30. See Williams, 393 U.S. at 31.
31. Id. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1968)).
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did not actually identify any compelling state interest or address the question
of narrow tailoring, factors typically integral to a strict scrutiny analysis."
After standing in defense of individual rights in Williams, the Court
dramatically changed its standard of review and sided with the states in
its very next ballot access case. In Jenness v. Fortson, the Court upheld
Georgia's electoral regulations that allowed independent candidates to
appear on the ballot only after filing a nominating petition signed by at
least five percent of the registered voters.3 The Court recognized the state
interest "in avoiding confusion, deception, and even frustration of the
democratic process at the general election."' Therefore, after holding that
Georgia's regulations did not "operate to freeze the political status quo,"
the Court simply deferred to the state interest and held the regulations did
not invoke the First Amendment.35 In Jenness, the Court applied the opposite standard of review applied in Williams, even though both sets of regulations placed restrictions, albeit in differing degrees, on individuals gaining ballot access. 6 The Court has oscillated between the standards of review used in these two cases ever since.
Shortly after Jenness, the Court decided two cases in which it used a
form of intermediate scrutiny that fell between the strict scrutiny review
employed in Williams and the rational basis review in Jenness 8 In Bullock v. Carter,the Court invalidated a Texas regulation requiring a large
filing fee in order for a candidate to get on the ballot.39 The Court stated
that the law must be "closely scrutinized," but noted that it required a
legitimate, not compelling, state interest to "pass constitutional muster.'"
Two years later, the Court upheld portions of the California Election
32. See Cofsky, supra note 5, at 369. Narrow tailoring simply means that the legislating body
must draft the regulation in a manner that has the least impact on individuals' constitutional rights. If
the regulation can be drafted in a less intrusive manner, the Court will invalidate it. Id at 412-13.
33. See Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 432 (1971).
34. Jenness, 403 U.S. at 442.
35. Id. at 438.
36. Id.; Williams, 393 U.S. at 31.
37. As one commentator explains, Williams and Jenness represent "polar extremes of
scrutiny." Shaffer, supra note 7, at 661; see also Cofsky, supra note 5, at 369, 371-73 (describing
the use of strict scrutiny in Williams and the "[rietreat from [sitrict [s]crutiny" in Jenness). In
Williams, the Court found that the state election regulation for third party access to the ballot was
overly burdensome and employed strict scrutiny to invalidate the regulation. Williams, 393 U.S. at
31. However, in Jenness, the Court found that the state regulation was not overly burdensome and
simply deferred to the state's interest in regulating its electoral process. Jenness, 403 U.S. at 442.
These cases established the two outer limits of the Court's approach to ballot access questions. The
various approaches used by the Court in its subsequent decisions all fall somewhere between these
two extremes. This Comment does not maintain that the final decisions reached in Williams and
Jenness were incorrect, but only that the Court needs to approach ballot access cases in a consistent
and clearly articulated manner.
38. See Cofsky, supra note 5, at 373-74. Under a tiered scrutiny approach, the Court
traditionally employs either strict scrutiny or rational basis, however, the Court more recently added
intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 402 n.244.
39. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
40. Bullock, 405 U.S. at 144.
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Code in Storer v. Brown, stating that previous case law did not suggest
that the Court "automatically invalidate[d] every substantial restriction
on the right to vote or to associate."4 The Court found stability in the political system as a "compelling" state interest, "outweighing the interest the candidate and his supporters may have in . . . seek[ing] independent ballot
status." 2 In effect, however, the Court only applied intermediate scrutiny as it
did not consider whether the regulations were narrowly tailored.43
In Anderson v. Celebrezze," and to a lesser degree in Burdick v. Takushi,"5 the Court attempted to back away from a tiered scrutiny analysis
and instead employed somewhat of a balancing test that weighed the
interests of the state against those of its citizens. ' Under Anderson, the
Court weighed the "character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the
rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff
seeks to vindicate," against the "precise interests put forward by the State
as justifications for the burden imposed." 7 In deciding between these interests "the Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of
each of those interests; it also must consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff s rights." 8 While citing the
"flexible" Anderson test, the Court, in Burdick, seemed to mix tiered
scrutiny and balancing concepts by explaining that "[in cases of] 'severe'
restrictions, the regulation must be 'narrowly drawn to advance a state
interest of compelling importance."' The Court went on to find that "when
a state election law provision imposes only 'reasonable, nondiscriminatory
restrictions' upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters,
'the State's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify'
the restrictions. '
The Court did not, however, continue to employ the balancing approach developed in Anderson and Burdick in all subsequent ballot access cases. In Norman v. Reed, '0 the Court seemed to abandon the balancing test for a tiered scrutiny approach." The Norman Court invalidated two Illinois ballot access regulations where it found that citizens
have the right to create new political parties which the state can only
41. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 729 (1974).
42. Storer,415 U.S. at 736.
43. See Cofsky, supranote 5, at 374.
44. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
45. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
46. See Rachel J. Grabow, Note, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission: Protecting the
Freedom of Speech or Damaging the Electoral Process?, 46 CATH. U. L. REv. 565, 582-83 (1997)
(describing the balancing test developed by the Court in Anderson); Shaffer, supra note 7, at 661.
47. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789.
48. Id.
49. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 428 (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992) and Anderson,
460 U.S. at 788). The Court in Timmons v. Twin CitiesArea New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997) also
used this type of analysis.
50. 502 U.S. 279 (1992).
51. See Cofsky, supranote 5, at 384.
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restrict if it "demonstrat[es] . . . a corresponding interest sufficiently
weighty to justify the limitation."" Additionally, the Court, possibly sugbe
gesting a return to strict scrutiny, held that any severe restriction must
"narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance. 53
As can be seen in this brief summary of case law relating to the standard
of review utilized in previous ballot access cases, the Court has had difficulty traversing through the "political thicket'' it once dared not enter. As
the Court anticipated in Storer, "[w]hat the result of this process will be in
any specific case may be very difficult to predict with great assurance.'
C. Aspects of Buckley Invoking the FirstAmendment
The Buckley Court's holding focused on facets of petition circulation
that it considered protected by First Amendment precedent.' Particularly,
the Court focused on the link between protected speech and the following: anonymity,"1 reduction in the potential number of eligible voices to
speak, 8 and compelled disclosure of ballot related expenditures. 9 The following cases provided the basis of the Buckley Court's opinion.
The Court discussed the First Amendment protection afforded to
anonymous literature in Talley v. California,where it held that it is unconstitutional for a city ordinance to prohibit all anonymous leafleting.' In
short, the Court found that the ordinance violated the First Amendment as
it "might deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of importance" because an individual might not speak for fear of identification and
"reprisal."' In 1995, the Court decided McIntyre v. Ohio Election Commission, where it extended the protection of anonymity to the electoral

52. Norman, 502 U.S. at 288-89.
53. Id. at 289.
54. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
55. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974).
56. See Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Found., 119 S.Ct. 636, 646-47 (1999).
57. See Buckley, 119 S.Ct. at 645-46. See also Erika King, Comment, Anonymous Campaign
Literature and the First Amendment, 21 N.C. CENT. L.J. 144, 168 (1995) (describing the delicate
balance between states' interest in protecting the integrity of the electoral process and the First
Amendment right of individuals to speak freely in the "marketplace" of ideas, whether openly or
under the protection of anonymity).
58. See Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 643; see also Lowenstein & Stern, supra note 15, at 182
(discussing the Court's holding in Meyer that ballot access regulations cannot limit "the number of
voices who will convey... [the ballot initiative proponent's] message and the hours they can speak
and, therefore, limit[] the size of the audience they can reach") (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S.
414, 422-23 (1988)).
59. See Buckley, 119 S.Ct. at 647; see also Grabow, supra note 46, at 577 (summarizing the
Court's decision in Buckley, where it held that compelled disclosure infringed on the First
Amendment interests of campaign contributors and that "significant encroachments on First
Amendment rights . . .cannot be justified by a mere showing of some legitimate governmental
interest." (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976))).
60. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960).
61. See Talley, 362 U.S. at 65.
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process." The Court held that an Ohio regulation prohibiting anonymous
campaign literature was "a regulation of pure speech"63 that "involve[d] a
limitation on political expression subject to exacting scrutiny. ' 64
In Meyer v. Grant, the Court addressed a ballot access regulation
which reduced the number of potential voices to carry the political message." The Meyer Court invalidated a Colorado law prohibiting the use
of paid petition circulators under "exacting scrutiny."' Significantly, the
Court held that "circulation of a petition involves the type of interactive
communication concerning political change that is appropriately described
as 'core political speech."'6 7 From this point, the Court found that the
regulation impermissibly restricted speech by "limit[ing] the number of
voices who w[ould] convey appellees' message," thus making "it less
likely that appellees w[ould] garner the number of signatures necessary to
place the matter on the ballot ....
,6 8
The final aspect of political speech relevant in Buckley is the notion
of compelled disclosure of ballot related expenditures. The primary case
on this topic is Buckley v. Valeo, where the Court upheld the federal disclosure requirements of the Federal Election Campaign Act.6 9 Noting that
"compelled disclosure, in itself, can seriously infringe on . . .the First
Amendment," the Court held that in such cases the government must demonstrate a "'substantial relation' between the governmental interest and the
information required to be disclosed" to survive "exacting scrutiny."7 °
However, because compelled disclosure requirements generally serve
"substantial governmental interests," the Court looked "to the extent of the
burden that they place on individual rights."" In Buckley v. Valeo, the federal regulations survived scrutiny by serving "substantial government interests." 2 The Court added slightly to this compelled disclosure analysis in
FirstNational Bank v. Bellotti, where it ruled that a state must show that
its compelled disclosure regulation serves a compelling state interest and is
narrowly drawn. 3

62. See McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 344-46 (1995).
63. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 345.
64. Id. at 346 (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420 (1988)).
65. See Meyer, 486 U.S. at 421-22 & n.5.
66. Id. at 420.
67. Id. at 421-22. See also infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
68. ld. at 422-23.
69. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 84 (1976). The disclosure requirements included
provisions that had candidates record the name and address of anyone contributing over ten dollars
and the name, address, occupation, and principal place of business for anyone contributing more
than one hundred dollars. Id. at 82.
70. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64 (quoting Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm'n., 372 U.S. 539,
546 (1963)).
71. Id. at 68.
72. Id. at 66-68. Significant government interests in the disclosure requirements include the
prevention of corruption and the enforcement of campaign contribution limitations. Id. at 83-84.
73. See First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978).
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II. BUCKLEY V. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOUNDATION, INC.
A. Factsand ProceduralHistory
In 1993 the American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., a nonprofit public interest organization, brought an action in United States
District Court against the Colorado Secretary of State pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. 7 The lawsuit challenged six ballot initiative regulations:
(1) the requirement that petition circulators be at least 18 years old;75 (2)
the requirement that petition circulators be registered voters;76 (3) the six
month petition circulation limitation;' (4) the requirement that petition
circulators wear badges stating their names, if they are paid, and if so, the
name and telephone number of their employer; 8 (5) the requirement that
the petition circulator attach an affidavit to each petition stating, inter
alia, the circulator's name and address;79 and (6) the requirement that the
initiative proponents disclose at the time the petition is filed, inter alia,
the names, addresses, and amount paid to each petition circulator.'
The Court of Appeals upheld that the age restriction, six-month
limitation period, and affidavit requirements as reasonable petition circulation regulations.' The Court of Appeals, however, determined that
the badge requirement, the portion of the disclosure regulations requiring
the release of the names of paid circulators, and the registration requirement violated the First Amendment.82 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the ruling of the Tenth Circuit. 3
B. Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court's majority opinion in Buckley, written by Justice
Ginsburg, began by stating that the circulation of petitions is "core political speech" resulting from the "interactive communication concerning
political change."' In such cases the "First Amendment ... is 'at its ze-

• 74. See Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Found., 119 S. Ct. 636, 640 (1999). The
American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., brought this action against the Secretary of State of
Colorado, Victoria Buckley, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. This statute waives governmental immunity
in certain instances by allowing a lawsuit to be brought against a government official who "subjects.
. . any citizen of the United States .. . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. 1999). The American Constitutional Law
Foundation argued that several of Colorado's ballot initiative regulations, enforced by the Secretary
of State of Colorado, violated the First Amendment rights of its members. Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 640.
75. See Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 640.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 640-41.
80. See id. at 641.
81. See id. at 642.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 649.
84. Id. at 639 (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414,422 (1988)).
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nith.' 8. In conflict with these interests, the Court recognized that states
have "considerable leeway to protect the integrity and reliability of the
initiative process .... ,,86 Lastly, the Court admitted that in this type of case
there is "no litmus-paper test"87 to determine the validity of these regulamust be made."88 Once the Court
tions and, therefore, "hard judgments ....
established the generally applicable law, it discussed each regulation in
earnest.
1.

Badge Requirement

The Court began by emphasizing that compelling petition circulators
to wear badges stating the individual's name impacted "one-on-one
at the precise moment when the circulator's interest in
communication ...
anonymity is greatest."89 It also noted that the impact of forfeiting anonymity is greater here than in Mclntyre because the individual must attempt to "persuade the electors to sign the petition," as opposed to simply distribute literature.9 The state argued that it needed the regulation to
apprehend,
can identify, and the State [can] ...
ensure that "the public ...
petition circulators who engage in misconduct."91 However, the Court
reasoned that the affidavit requirement provided an adequate disclosure
of such information. 92 The affidavit requirement was permissible because
it provided the information after the one-on-one communication between
petition circulators and potential supporters has concluded, thereby lessening the burden on speech.93
2.

Registration Requirement

The Court addressed the registration requirement in the same manner
as the prohibition against paid circulators in Meyer, stating that the registration requirement placed the same type of reduction in "voter-eligible
population" as the ban on using paid circulators had in Meyer." After
accepting the District Court's finding that Colorado has over 400,000
individuals that are not registered voters, but are otherwise qualified to
circulate petitions, the Court found the regulation an impermissible
means of decreasing the "number of voices who will convey [the initiative proponents'] message."9

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 640 (quoting Meyer, 486 U.S. at 425).
Id. at 642.
Id. (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).
Id. (quoting Storer, 415 U.S. at730).
Id. at 646.
Id.
Id.at 645.
See id.
See id.
Id.at643.
Id.at644 (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422 (1988)).
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The Court again noted that the affidavit requirement would satisfy
Colorado's interest in ensuring that petition circulators who violated the
initiative regulations would be subject to the subpoena power of the Secretary of State.' The Court dismissed Colorado's reasoning that the registration requirement was not a heavy burden on speech because it was
"exceptionally easy to register to vote."97 It emphasized the testimony
from ballot initiators who claimed that the decision not to register was a
political choice.98 Finally, the Court did not articulate a standard of review in evaluating this regulation, possibly because it implied that this
case was indistinguishable from the one in Meyer where it employed
exacting scrutiny. However, it did state that Colorado failed to articulate
an "impelling" interest to sustain the registration requirement."
3. Disclosure Requirement
In agreeing with the Circuit Court's decision to invalidate the disclosure requirements that pertained to the names and addresses of paid
circulators, the Court followed its decision in Valeo and employed exacting scrutiny."° Although the Court upheld the disclosure regulations in
Valeo, the Court declined to do so here because the risk of "quid pro
quo" corruption is not as great in the ballot initiative process as it is for
political candidates.'"' However, unlike most other ballot access cases,
the Court did not focus on the burden the regulation had on speech, but
simply stated that it felt the additional information provided from the
regulation "is hardly apparent and has not been demonstrated."'"
C. ConcurringOpinion
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas, seemingly frustrated by the way
the majority further added to the confusion of the proper standard of review for ballot access cases, articulated what he believed to be the "nowsettled approach."' 3 Justice Thomas stated that "[w]hen a State's rule
imposes severe burdens on speech or association, it must be narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling interest; lesser burdens trigger less exacting review, and a State's important regulatory interests are typically

96. See id. at 644.
97. Id.
98. See id.
99. Id. at 645.
100. See id. at 647.
101. Id. at 647-48.
102. Id. at 647.
103. Id. at 649 (Thomas, J., concurring). Based on his relatively lengthy concurrence that
describes in detail the approach he feels the Court has developed to deal with the difficult problems
presented in ballot access cases, Justice Thomas appears to be frustrated by the way the Court
addressed, or failed to address, the proper standard of review in its decision to invalidate the selected
ballot initiative regulations. See id. at 649-59.
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enough to justify reasonable restrictions."'" Justice Thomas continued by
stating that, although "there is no bright line separating severe from
lesser burdens," the direct or indirect regulation of "core political
speech" requires "strict scrutiny."' 5 However, regulations that burden
"voting and associational interest" are "harder to predict" and have been
evaluated on a case-by-case basis.'" Following this reasoning, Justice
Thomas stated that all three of the regulations found unconstitutional
should be analyzed under strict scrutiny.'" He argued that the badge requirement regulated core political speech and the registration and disclosure requirements burdened associational interests, and hence were controlled by Meyer and Valeo, respectively. 8
D. Opinion Concurringin the Judgment in Partand Dissenting in Part

Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Breyer, concurred with the majority only in regard to its decision concerning the badge requirement."
Although Justice O'Connor reached a different conclusion than Justice
Thomas regarding the registration and disclosure regulations, she advocated a similar analytical approach. She opined that the Court should
analyze regulations substantially burdening "one-on-one communication" under strict scrutiny and regulations primarily targeting the "electoral process" under a "reasonableness" standard."' Not satisfied by the
evidence that the decision not to register was a political one or that the
registration regulation silenced those "able and willing" to circulate petitions, Justice O'Connor distinguished the registration requirement from
the one in Meyer and argued that the Court should uphold it."' Additionally, Justice O'Connor argued that, while advancing "Colorado's interest
in law enforcement,""' the Court should uphold the disclosure regulation
as it was directed at the "electoral process with an indirect and insignificant effect on speech.""'
E. Dissenting Opinion

In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist, noted for his disapproval of
the over-zealous use of strict scrutiny,"' focused mainly on the registra104. Id. at 649. Justice Thomas's summary of the "now settled approach" is one used in
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) and Timmons v. Twin Cites Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351
(1997). See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 650.
107. See id. at 651-53.
108. See id.
109. Id. at 654 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 654-55 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
111. Id.at 655.
112. Id.at 658.
113. Id.at657.
114. See Richard A. Brisbin, Jr. & Edward V. Heck, The Battle Over Strict Scrutiny:
Coalitional Conflict in the Rehnquist Court, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1049, 1057-58 (1992)
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tion requirement. Stating that the invalidation of the registration requirement "calls into question the validity of any regulation... [that] diminish[es] the pool of petition circulators or mak[es] a proposal less likely to
appear on the ballot,""' 5 Justice Rehnquist argued that "a State should be
able to limit the ability to circulate initiative petitions to those people
who can ultimately vote on those initiatives at the polls.""' 6 In conclusion,
Justice Rehnquist agreed with the majority regarding the badge regulation, but disagreed over the disclosure regulation, stating that it did not
require any additional information that would impact speech differently
than the affidavit requirement."7
III. ANALYSIS
The holding in Buckley illustrates the difficulty the Court has in
implementing a consistent standard of review and analytical approach to
ballot access cases and the unpredictable rulings that result. The Court
used the First Amendment to strike down the badge, registration and
disclosure regulations that, although each controlled an aspect of Colorado's ballot initiative process, had vastly different impacts on speech.
As a result of the lack of clear guidance provided by previous ballot access cases, the Court, although proclaiming that "[p]recedent guides our
review," "8had to take a disjunctive approach in reviewing these initiative regulations. This approach, in the case of the registration and disclosure regulations, lost sight of what was in need of protection. The following section analyzes the three rulings in Buckley in detail and suggests an alternative approach to evaluating ballot initiative cases.
A. Badge Requirement

The Court's ruling that invalidated the badge regulation is, as all the
Justices agreed, a well-founded use of the First Amendment to protect
political speech."9 The reason for this agreement is that the regulation
directly "involve[s] a one-on-one communication.""'2 It is difficult to
argue that individuals would not be more hesitant to passionately advocate a controversial ballot initiative, such as the legalization of marijuana, if they had to do so without the shroud of anonymity.'2' Recognizing that the badge requirement impacts "the precise moment when the

(describing the debate over the use of strict scrutiny in the Rehnquist Court and noting that the Chief
Justice was the only justice who consistently disagreed with the use of strict scrutiny in certain cases
where the First Amendment right of political expression was implicated).
115. Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 659 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 661.
117. Seeid. at662.
118. Id. at 639.
119. See id. at 646, 651, 654, 662.
120. Id. at 646.
121. See generally McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-43 (1995)
(describing the historical treatment of anonymous speech by the Court).
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circulator's interest in anonymity is greatest,"'22 the Court distinguishes
this requirement from the affidavit requirement that it upheld by noting
that "the affidavit is separated from the moment the circulator speaks."'"
After finding that the badge requirement directly impacts one-on-one
communication, the Court applied "exacting scrutiny."'2 " Under this standard, Colorado's interests in law enforcement failed to survive as the
Court did not feel it added much benefit to the affidavit requirement to
justify its burden on speech.'" This approach achieves an equitable balance between state and individual interests because it first identifies and
evaluates the impact the regulations have on First Amendment interests,
and then applies a level of scrutiny proportional to the burden. This approach helps to ensure that the Court will strike down a state election regulation as a violation of the First Amendment only after determining that at
least one of the Amendment's protected interests is truly implicated.
B. RegistrationRequirement
Unlike its analysis of the badge requirement, the Court did not first
determine whether the registration requirement burdened one-on-one
communication.'" Instead, the Court, relying on its decision in Meyer and
the finding of the District Court that over 400,000 Colorado residents
were not registered voters, simply stated that the regulation imposed a
restriction on speech by "drastically reduc[ing] the number of persons... available to circulate petitions.""'2 However, the regulation did
not burden speech when it reduced the number of individuals eligible to
circulate petitions. Unregistered individuals were still able to discuss
ballot issues with anyone they wish.'28 The only limitation was that unregistered voters could not ask supporters to sign petitions. This in no
way limits speech. Even assuming, arguendo, that the regulation in
Meyer burdened speech, the regulation in Buckley is much less burdensome as it did not foreclose a group from circulating petitions, as the
Meyer regulation did against paid individuals. Further, the Buckley
regulation was not a criminal statute as the regulation was in Meyer.

122. Buckley, 119 S. Ct at 646.
123. Id. at 645.
124. Id.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 642-43.
127. Id. at 643.
128. See generally Lowenstein & Stem, supra note 15, at 221 (using a similar argument to
criticize the Court's holding that the prohibition against using paid petition circulators was a
violation of the First Amendment in Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988)).
129. It could be argued that Colorado's registration requirement foreclosed unregistered voters
as a group from circulating petitions. See Lowenstein & Stem, supra note 15, at 216-17. However,
the vast majority of these individuals could easily register to vote that would allow them to circulate
petitions, whereas in Meyer the regulation prohibited any paid circulator from ever circulating
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The Court's reasoning expands the First Amendment to protect an individual's ability to place an issue on the ballot. Consequently, a state
would arguably be in violation of the First Amendment by increasing the
number of signatures or decreasing the time allotted to get a petition on
the ballot.'3 ° Unlike regulations in other ballot access cases already mentioned, the registration requirement does not discriminate against any group
or individual. It is'simply a "reasonable, nondiscriminatory restriction" that
states are permitted to enact in order to regulate the election process."'
Finally, the Court's reasoning that individuals choose not to register
as a means of political expression is attenuated.'32 Registering does not
require being associated with any political party, but merely shows a
desire to vote. It is also difficult to give the self-serving testimony of the
plaintiffs much merit where they argue that individuals decide not to
register to vote because they don't believe that the "political process is
responsive to their needs," "' yet they use the electoral process to attempt
to get ballot initiatives passed by the support of registered voters. As
Justice O'Connor summarized in her dissent, "the existence and severity
of this burden [on political speech] is not as clearly established in the
record as the respondents, or the Court, suggests."'34 Consequently, the
Court's use of exacting scrutiny to invalidate the registration regulation
was misapplied.
C. Disclosure Requirement
As in its evaluation of the registration requirement, the Court did not
first evaluate if the disclosure requirement impacted one-on-one communication, but applied exacting scrutiny to the regulation because it had
done so in a previous case with seemingly similar facts. Here, the Court
stated that any compelled disclosure regulation was subject to exacting
scrutiny due to its ruling in Valeo.' 5 However, in Valeo the Court only
stated that compelled disclosure statements "can seriously infringe on...
the First Amendment,"'36 but that the Court still needs to determine "the
extent of the burden ....
In Valeo, the Court stated that individuals may not contribute to political candidates if their names and contribution amounts must be disclosed to the public. Nevertheless, the Court upheld the regulation due to

petitions. It seems likely that significantly fewer individuals would decide to forgo circulating
petitions as a result of having to register to vote then from having to forfeit financial compensation.
130. See Lowenstein & Stem, supra note 15, at 218-19.
131. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).
132. See Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 644 (providing no precedence for stating that the decision not to
register is a form of political speech).
133. Id.
134. See id. at 655 (O'Conner, J.,
dissenting).
135. Id. at 647.
136. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,64 (1976) (emphasis added).
137. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68 (emphasis added).
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the significant government interests in fraud protection and the appearance of political integrity.'38 In Buckley, the Court feared that the disclosure requirement would prevent individuals from circulating petitions
because they would lose their anonymity. Unlike the badge requirement,
however, the effects of the regulation would be "separated from the moment the circulator speaks."'39 The only way a potential supporter of a
petition would know the identity of a petition circulator is if she went to
public records.'" Since there appears to be no evidence that this occurred, it
is unlikely that any petition circulator has ever been affected by this possibility. Without establishing that this disclosure requirement actually burdened speech, the Court's use of exacting scrutiny was inappropriate.
D. Suggested Approach
It is apparent from the Court's difficulty in establishing a consistent
standard of review in ballot access cases that the principle challenge
facing the Court is how to resolve the obvious conflict between the
weighty constitutional interests of both the state and its citizens. Although identifying the conflict in such cases may be straightforward,
determining a way to handle each conflict in a consistent manner that
protects the interests of both sides is not. As the Court and commentators
have realized, the "inherent difficulty in election ballot law . . . is that
constitutional infringement in these cases is a matter of degree.""'
In Williams v. Rhodes, for example, Ohio's election laws required
that third party candidates file petitions early on in the election year
signed by individuals representing fifteen percent of the number of ballots cast in the last gubernatorial election, as opposed to ten percent for
major parties, erect an elaborate party structure, and conduct primaries.' 2
Whereas, in Jenness v. Fortson, Georgia's ballot access regulations were
much less restrictive and only required independent candidates to garner
signatures from ten percent of the eligible voters and imposed no requirement of elaborate party structure or early submission
requirements.'43 Although both states had a substantial interest in protecting its own electoral process, the difference in the degree that the
regulations infringed upon the First Amendment interests of each state's
citizens was considerable.
In both cases, the Court achieved the correct result, yet it did so at the
expense of a consistent approach. This is not to say that the Court's use
138. See id. at 66-68.
139. Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Found., 119 S. Ct. 636, 656 (1999) (quoting the
majority opinion at 645).
140. Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 658.
141. See Shaffer, supra note 7, at 662.
142. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 24-26 & n.1 (1968); GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra
note 7, at 891.
143. See Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 438-39 (1971).
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of strict scrutiny in Williams or deferential review in Jenness was inappropriate, but simply that the Court needs to clearly establish its analytical process so that there can be a reasonable level of predictability in
subsequent decisions. Without a consistent approach, the Court provides
no way for lower courts and, even more importantly, state legislatures to
reasonably determine whether a state ballot access regulation has overstepped its constitutional bounds.
It is clear from even a cursory review of the facts in Williams and
Jenness that applying one standard of review to all ballot access cases
would lead to absurd results that would tread far too heavily on either
state or individual interests. Moreover, due to the magnitude of the interests involved and the substantial need for consistent results, a balancing
approach, similar to that employed in Anderson, would also be difficult
for the Supreme Court, and especially lower courts, to effectively employ
in subsequent cases with any consistency.'"
The Court could avoid the inconsistency and unpredictability in its review of ballot access cases by adopting an analysis that first determines
whether the regulation involves "core political speech"'' 5 or whether it is
simply a non-discriminatory regulation directed at the electoral process. As
the Court held in Buckley, core political speech involves "interactive communication concerning political change,"''

nication."'47

6

or simply "one-on-one commu-

If the Court finds that the regulation does not involve core political speech, it should apply deferential scrutiny and uphold the state regulation as long as it is not so burdensome that it still ultimately impacts core
political speech.' 8
Conversely, if the regulation does involve core political speech, the
plaintiff should then be required to demonstrate an actual negative impact on
her First Amendment interests. In the case of the registration and disclosure
regulations in Buckley, this requirement would call for the plaintiff to admit
evidence of an actual reduction in the number of ballot circulators resulting

144. As one commentator states:
While a balancing test may appear to provide courts with greater leeway to evaluate
competing interests, courts may also capture this benefit in a system of tiered scrutiny
which accurately measures states' and individuals' respective interests. Furthermore, a
system of tiered scrutiny provides a more coherent and administrable standard to lower
courts and tends to afford a more appropriate level of deference to state legislative
enactments.
Cofsky, supranote 5, at 402.
145. Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 639 (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422 (1988)).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 646.
148. For example, in Williams, the state ballot access regulations were so burdensome that they
foreclosed the ballot access to third-party candidates by making it "virtually impossible for a new
political party ... to be placed on the state ballot .. " Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 24 (1968).
Under these circumstances, it is clear that the ballot access regulations were not used uniformly to
regulate the electoral process, but as a way to prevent third-party candidates from appearing on the
ballot, which clearly burdens core political speech.
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from the challenged regulation. 9 This would be a substantially higher hurdle
than simply submitting evidence that the regulation may possibly, or hypothetically, reduce the number of potential petition circulators as seen in
Buckley. If the plaintiff meets this burden, the Court should use exacting
scrutiny to determine if the state regulation is narrowly tailored and serves a
compelling state interest. This would still lend substantial weight to individuals' First Amendment rights, while not unduly restraining the state from
enacting needed ballot regulations.
If the plaintiff does not meet this burden, however, the Court should
simply ensure that the state regulation is a reasonable, non-discriminatory
restriction. 150 This would substantially reduce the amount of uncertainty
presently involved in enacting ballot access laws because individual plaintiffs are currently only required, as evidenced in Buckley, to submit evidence
of ways the challenged regulation may possibly infringe on their First
Amendment interests. While not perfect, this suggested approach to ballot
access cases, particular concerning ballot initiatives, offers protection to the
interests of both the states and individuals while providing a consistent approach for lower courts to follow, greatly simplifying their determination of
the appropriate standard of review."'

149. This assumes, of course, that the circulation of petitions is in fact "core political speech."
Buckley, 119 S.Ct. at 641. It could be argued that regulations of the ballot initiative process such as
those in Buckely do not implicate the First Amendment as the regulations do not prohibit individuals
from discussing any political issue and that thus these regulations are simply a way for states to
control the electoral process. It should be noted that the ballot initiative process has not even been
instituted in every state, in fact, the majority of states do not even allow their citizens to enact any
legislation except through the legislature. See Collins & Oesterle, supra note 16, at 49-50. This is
not to suggest, however, that simply because states are not required to have a ballot initiative process
that they can regulate the process in any manner they choose without violating the First Amendment.
Obviously, a regulation that states that only Democrats can circulate petitions would certainly be
unconstitutional. See Lowenstein & Stem, supra note 15, at 218.
150. It could be argued that this approach is primarily the one developed in Anderson and later
revised in Burdick. It, however, differs in two significant respects. First, it does not require the court
to weigh "the character and magnitude of the asserted injury" against the "precise interests put
forward by the State .. " Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983). This suggested
approach only requires the court to determine whether the plaintiff can show an actual, not simply
possible or hypothetical, impact on her First Amendment rights. This avoids some of the
unpredictable outcomes that result from the use of a balancing test. Second, it does not require the
Court to determine which burdens are "severe" and which are not. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,
434 (1992) (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279 (1992)). As stated by Justice Thomas in his
dissent "unfortunately there is no bright line separating severe from lesser burdens." Buckley, 119 S.
Ct. 636, 649 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring). If the court determines that the regulation involves
core political speech and the plaintiffs First Amendment rights have been burdened, then it should
apply strict scrutiny, if not, it should apply deferential review.
151. See generally Cofsky, supra note 5, at 390-401. This articles provides descriptions of
several lower court decisions to demonstrate the difficulty lower courts have applying the law the
Supreme Court developed in ballot access cases. For example, the author states "the Fourth Circuit
determined that the appropriate standard to examine ballot access restrictions was a 'modified'
Anderson balancing test ....[When] presented with a similar state regulation ... the Sixth Circuit
simply analogized the facts of Anderson to the instant fact pattern and cursorily noted the 'unclear'
standard of review suggested by the Supreme Court ....[Finally,] [t]he Eighth Circuit remained unable
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IV.CONCLUSION

By failing to establish a clear and consistent application of a standard of
review in ballot access cases, the Court in Buckley took a disjunctive approach
to reviewing the constitutionality of Colorado's ballot initiatives. By not first
establishing that the registration and disclosure regulations even burdened oneon-one political speech, the Court lost sight of the limits of protection encompassed in the First Amendment and, consequently, took away power from the
states to regulate the electoral process. This has only added to the uncertainty
of whether many state ballot access regulation run afoul of the First Amendment and leaves lower courts to continue sifting through inconsistent case law
for the appropriate standard of review to apply when these regulations are
challenged. Although the Court has long recognized the dangers within the
"political thicket,"'5 2 it has yet to establish a consistent way to deal with the
conflict between state and individual interests implicated by state regulation of
the electoral process. This Comment suggests a starting point.
DanielS. Young*

to 'resolve [the] ... in
consistent standards of review,' noting that '[in some cases, the Court
articulated and employed a flexible test ... yet on other occasions it suggested that all election and
voting regulations must be subjected to strict scrutiny."'
152. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
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